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A sample of 162 children aged from 5 to 9 was pretested to discover each child's "rule" for 
predicting the movement of a mathematical balance beam. Children then worked alone, with a 
partner who used the same rule, with a partner who was more competent, or with a partner who 
was less competent. If partners' predictions differed, the dyad members were asked to discuss 
and reach agreement, but were not given feedback. All children were subsequently given 2 
individual posttests. The results revealed that regression in thinking was as likely a consequence 
as improvement, both proving stable. Benefits accrued primarily to those whose partner was 
more competent, but understanding of the outcomes of collaboration required attending both to 
the nature of the rules (whether they allowed consistent or inconsistent prediction) and the shared 
understanding attained during the paired session. 
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Under what circumstances can pairs of children help each other improve their thinking while 
working together on a task? Can working collaboratively adversely affect children's thinking? 
Does it matter whether they have the same initial understanding of the task or differ in their 
levels of competence? What are the mechanisms that translate collaboration into more advanced 
thinking? These are the questions to be explored in this paper. My goal is to examine peer 
interaction from a Vygotskian perspective, focusing on both the outcomes and processes of 
collaboration. 
 
Most research over the last 2 decades that has examined the relation between peer social 
interaction and cognitive development has been based on the theories of either Piaget or 
Vygotsky (for reviews see, e.g., Azmitia & Perlmutter, 1989; Tudge & Rogoff, 1989; Tudge & 
Winterhoff, in press). Scholars influenced by Piaget (e.g., Doise & Mugny, 1984; Murray, 1982, 
1983; Perret-Clermont, 1980) view cognitive development as most likely to result from 
interaction when there is a difference in perspectives between peers (as opposed to adult-child 
dyads) that gives rise to arguments between them (sociocognitive conflict). According to Piaget 
(1959, 1977), children who have reached the concrete operational stage should benefit more 
from collaboration than their younger peers. 
 
The typical Piagetian research paradigm in this domain features conserver-nonconserver dyads 
who are asked to reach agreement on conservation or spatial perspective problems and are then 
tested individually to determine whether the nonconservers have advanced. In this situation, the 
nonconserving members of dyads are highly likely to attain conservation, and continue to 
provide conservation responses up to a month later (Murray, 1982, 1983). Moreover, the 
conserving members do not regress as a result of interaction, except under unusual conditions 
(when conserving children view an adult model who provides nonconservation responses 
[Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1972, 1978]), and then the regression is not stable (Ames & Murray, 
1982; Robert & Charbonneau, 1977, 1978). 
 
Researchers in the Vygotskian tradition, much like their Piagetian counterparts, argue that 
development is most likely to occur when two participants differ in terms of their initial level of 
competence about some skill or task, work collaboratively on it, and arrive at shared 
understanding. However, whereas Piaget stressed the virtues of peer interaction, Vygotsky 
argued that collaboration with a more competent partner, whether adult or peer, could be 
beneficial. Vygotsky, moreover, argued that the benefits of social interaction begin in infancy. 
 
Most Vygotsky-inspired researchers who study cognitive effects of collaboration have dealt with 
adult-child interaction (Brown & Ferrara, 1985; McLane, 1987; Newman, Griffin, & Cole, 1989; 
Saxe, Gearhart, & Guberman, 1984; Tharp & Gallimore, 1988; Valsiner, 1984, 1987; Wertsch, 
1979; Wertsch & Hickmann, 1987; Wood, 1988), although a few scholars have examined peer 
interaction, either in comparison with adult-child interaction (Ellis & Rogoff, 1982, 1986; 
Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989) or in its own right (Forman & Cazden, 1985; Forman & McPhail, in 
press). 
 
There are two key concepts for researchers who utilize a Vygotskian perspective. The first is the 
"zone of proximal development"; for collaboration to lead to development, interactions should be 
within the less competent partner's zone of proximal development. The second key concept is 
that of intersubjectivity, or the process whereby two participants in a task who begin with 
different understandings of it arrive at shared understanding in the course of communication. 
 
Vygotsky defined the zone of proximal development as that area of development into which a 
child can be led in the course of interaction with a more competent partner, either adult or peer. 
The zone of proximal development has been discussed at some length elsewhere (Cole, 1985; 
Moll, 1990; Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984; Valsiner, 1987; Valsiner & van der Veer, in press); suffice 
it to say that the zone is not some clear-cut space that exists independently of the process of joint 
activity itself. Rather, it is the difference between what the child can accomplish independently 
and what he or she can achieve in conjunction with another, more competent, person. The zone is 
thus something that is created in the course of social interaction: "We propose that an essential 
feature of learning is that it creates the zone of proximal development; that is, learning awakens a 
variety of developmental processes that are able to operate only when the child is interacting 
with people in his environment and in collaboration with his peers" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 90). 
 
The second concept that, from a Vygotskian perspective, is essential for understanding the 
processes and consequences of peer collaboration is intersubjectivity. As Behrend (1990) has 
pointed out, intersubjectivity has been defined in different ways by those using the term (Rogoff, 
1990; Rommetveit, 1979, 1985; Trevarthen, 1979, 1980; Wertsch, 1985). My use of the term is 
based on the view that individuals come to a task, problem, or conversation with their own 
subjective ways of making sense of it. If they then discuss their differing viewpoints, shared 
understanding may be attained. As Rommetveit states it: "Communication aims at transcendence 
of the 'private' worlds of the participants. It sets up what we might call 'states of 
intersubjectivity"' (1979, p. 94). In other words, in the course of communication, participants 
may arrive at some mutually agreed-upon, or intersubjective, understanding. 
 
Scholars working in the tradition of Vygotsky (like those influenced by Piaget) would argue that 
if partners already have the same understanding of a task (share the same subjective sense of it), 
the situation is little different from exploring the problem alone; development is less likely to 
occur than if they have different initial understandings. On the other hand, an initial difference in 
understanding may not lead to development if one partner simply agrees with the other with no 
attempt to understand the other's viewpoint-in which case intersubjectivity would not have been 
attained. Similarly, one would not expect development to occur if the gulf between the 
participants were too great to allow for shared understanding. 
 
A critical element of Vygotsky's theory is that the more competent thinking or performance 
displayed by the child in the collaborative process itself should be internalized or "appropriated" 
(Leontyev, 1981; Rogoff, 1990) for use in subsequent individual performance. As Vygotsky 
wrote with reference to the results of interaction between a teacher and child, when the child 
subsequently solves a problem independently, "he continues to act in collaboration, even though 
the teacher is not standing near him .... This help—this aspect of collaboration—is invisibly 
present. It is contained in what looks from the outside like the child's independent solution of the 
problem" (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 216). In other words, the intersubjective understanding gained in 
the course of collaboration becomes the child's own (though socially derived) subjective 
understanding, an understanding that incorporates the shared understanding previously 
established. 
 
With the exception of his discussion of the way in which a child, in the course of play, creates 
his or her own zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978), Vygotsky only described 
interactions between adults and children, more specifically, teachers and children. Vygotsky 
declared that more competent peers may be effective in assisting a less competent child's 
development, but he did not discuss the impact of such collaboration on the more competent 
child's thinking. Of particular concern for researchers interested in peer collaboration is the fact 
that participants' relative degrees of competence (as judged by prior independent testing) may be 
less apparent to the partners than to the researcher, and the less competent partner might 
persuade the other of the correctness of his or her problem solution. Thus, arriving at a situation 
of shared meaning or intersubjectivity could have either deleterious or beneficial consequences, 
depending on whose initial understanding is accepted as correct. 
 
The research to be described below focuses first on the consequences of collaborating with a 
partner assessed as being at the same competence level, with a more competent partner, with a 
less competent partner, or with no partner. However, as Vygotsky argued with regard to the 
higher forms of mental functioning, such as problem solving: "We need to concentrate not on the 
product of development but on the very process by which higher forms are established" (1978, p. 
64). Therefore, the second focus of this paper is on the collaborative processes themselves, 
particularly those engendered by the dyads featuring different levels of competence, for it is here 







The sample consisted of 162 children aged from 5 to 9, of whom nine were subsequently 
dropped. Of the 153 who participated further, 51 were in kindergarten  classes (25 male, 26 
female, M age = 66.6 months, SD = 3.9, range 60-72 months), 55 were in mixed first- and 
second-grade classes (26 male, 29 female, M = 82.9 months, SD = 8.7, range 72-100 months), 
and 47 were in mixed third- and fourth-grade classes (19 male, 28 female, M = 112.0 months, SD 
= 8.8, range 99-134 months). All participants were drawn from an open-enrollment public 




A mathematical balance beam was used, similar to that employed by Siegler in his extensive 
research on the development of rule-based thinking in children (Siegler, 1976, 1981). This task 
was used because each "rule" requires thinking that deals with the relevant variables in a more 
sophisticated way than lower rules, and because no children of the ages of interest were likely to 
be at ceiling. 
 
The beam had eight removable sticks placed at equal distances from the central fulcrum, and was 
held stable by wooden blocks supporting it at both ends. The blocks were removable to allow the 
children to observe free movement of the beam at the start of the experiment, but thereafter 
remained in place. Metal nuts that fitted over the sticks were used as the weights in the pretest 
and two posttests. In the treatment, when the children were paired, the content of the task was 
similar but the form was different; the sticks were replaced by clear plastic beakers and the 
weights were replaced by identical plastic figures that were placed into the beakers. This was 
done so that the children would be less tempted to try to "remember" configurations they had 
seen in the previous session. 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples from each of the six types of balance beam problems. 
 
The actual configurations were taken, with minor variations, from those used by Siegler (1981), 
who used 24 problems, comprising four each of the six different "problem types" indicated in 
Figure 1. For the present study, 14 different problem configurations were used, including four 
simple distance problems and two of each of the remaining problem types. Half of Siegler's 
(1981) problems were used for the pretest and second posttest, the other half for the treatment 
(with two additional simple distance problems in each instance), and very similar problems were 
used for the first posttest. In each case, the weights were placed on only one stick on each side of 
the fulcrum, with a maximum of six weights on any one side and a maximum of 10 on both 
sticks. 
 
Assignment to Rule 
 
Siegler (1981) identified four basic rules (and one variant) that children use to predict the 
movement of a balance beam when different numbers of weights are placed at varying distances 
from the fulcrum. During pilot testing, however, it became obvious that finer degrees of 
differentiation were possible. Seven rules can reliably be identified, ranging from simple 
guesswork, with no consistent attempt to consider either number of weights or distances, to the 
ability to predict precisely what will happen when any configuration of weights is placed on the 
beam. 
 
Rule 0.—No understanding either of the idea of balance or of what will happen when one side of 
the beam has more weights. Of the original 162 children who were tested, nine were dropped as 
they used Rule 0. 
 
Rule 1 (Siegler's Rule I').—Children using this rule consistently predict that the side that has the 
greater number of weights will tip down (simple weight and all complex problems [see Fig. 1]), 
but inconsistently guess either one side or the other for problems with equal weights (simple 
balance and distance problems). Eleven children, mean age 72.9 months, range 62-107 months, 
used this rule. 
 
Rule 2 (Siegler's Rule I).—Children using this rule consistently predict that the side that has the 
greater number of weights will tip, and that the remaining problems will balance. Fifty-two 
children, mean age 76.9 months, range 60-117 months, used this rule. 
 
Rule 3 (Not described by Siegler).—Children using this rule consistently predict that the side 
with the greater number of weights will tip, and that the simple balance problems will balance. 
Their predictions about the four simple distance problems are inconsistent, however, with respect 
both to taking distance into account and (if considering distance) whether the beam will tip to the 
side furthest from or closest to the fulcrum. One or two predictions that simple distance problems 
would tip, justified with reference to distance, were sufficient to classify a child as using Rule 3 
(assuming the remaining predictions reflected Rule 2 reasoning). Twenty-four children, mean 
age 83.2 months, range 61-119 months, used this rule. 
 
Rule 4 (Siegler' s Rule II).—Children using this rule consistently predict that the side with the 
greater number of weights will tip, that the simple balance problems will balance, and that the 
simple distance problems will tip to the side furthest from the fulcrum. Children using this rule 
simultaneously consider the variables of number and distance when the numbers are equal but 
the distance is not. Thirty-five children, mean age 90.1 months, range 65-131 months, used this 
rule. 
 
Rule 5 (Siegler's Rule III).—Children using this rule predict consistently (and correctly) for all 
the simple problems, but predict inconsistently for the complex problems. Children using this 
rule view distance as important even when the numbers of weights are different, but sometimes 
predict that the complex problems tip to the side with greater number, sometimes to the side with 
greater distance, and sometimes balance—and make their decision by guesswork. One or more 
predictions in which a child argued that distance was as or more important than numbers of 
weights on the complex problems was sufficient to classify that child as using Rule 5, assuming 
that the remaining predictions were appropriate to Rule 4. Thirty-one children, mean age 101.9 
months, range 60-134 months, used this rule. 
 
Rule 6 (Siegler's Rule IV).—This rule features an understanding of what will happen in each 
problem, gained by multiplying the number of weights by the distance from the fulcrum. All 
configurations can be consistently and correctly predicted. No children used this rule. 
 
To ascertain which rule children used required examination of the entire pattern of predictions 
and justifications to all 14 problems. Siegler (1981) required that children predict appropriately 
for a minimum of 20 of 24 problems to be classified as using one rule or another. In this study, a 
minimum of 13 of 14 problems was used to classify a child; one prediction, at variance with the 
remaining pattern, was insufficient to move a child to the next lower rule. However (as 
mentioned above), one discrepant prediction was sufficient to move a child to the next higher 




Pretest.—Having spent several days in each classroom, the experimenter explained and 
demonstrated the working of the apparatus to each child, individually, after which the 14 
problems were presented. The child was asked to predict whether the beam would stay balanced 
or tip one way or the other if the supports were removed (they never were removed), and to 
justify that prediction. 
 
Treatment.—The treatment phase occurred a minimum of 2 days (maximum 12 days) after 
pretesting in each class (M = 3.87 days, SD = 1.37). Participants were assigned to one of three 
treatment conditions: (1) A control group, in which subjects had no partner, and were always 
tested individually (n = 41). (2) An "equal rule" group, in which each child was paired with 
another child who, at pretest, had used the same rule as he or she had (n = 38). For purposes of 
analysis, one member of each equal rule dyad was randomly dropped, to allow independence of 
the units of analysis (retained n = 19). (3) An "unequal rule" group, in which each child was 
paired with another child who, in the pretest, had used a different rule than he or she had (n = 
74). For purposes of analysis, only one member of each dyad (either the less competent or more 
competent member, chosen at random) was retained. This process resulted in a group of less 
competent members (n = 19) and a group of more competent members (n = 18), all of whom 
were independent of each other. 
 
Assignment to treatment condition was governed by the following constraints. Pairs were of the 
same gender and school class, and could be no more than two rules apart. Wherever possible, 
classmates were distributed so as to get equal numbers of individuals, equal rule children, less 
competent members, and more competent members. Within these constraints, and the fact that 
Rule 1 children could not be assigned to be higher partners and Rule 5 children could not be 
assigned to be lower partners, children using the same rule were randomly assigned to condition. 
 
Members of pairs took turns to be the first to predict each configuration. After both had made 
their predictions, each child was asked, in turn, to justify his or her prediction. When their 
predictions conflicted, the children were asked to explain their reasons to one another and reach 
agreement on one prediction. At this point, the experimenter moved out of obvious earshot (to 
allow the children to discuss freely), returning when the children had reached agreement. No 
feedback was provided at any point, either from the materials or by the experimenter, who 
participated in all phases of the research. 
 
Posttests.—The children were retested individually, to determine whether or not there had been 
any change in their rule use several days after the treatment (M = 2.68 days, SD = 2.22, range 2-
9 days). A second posttest was given, to determine the stability of any changes that might have 
taken place, a minimum of 4 weeks after the first posttest (M = 32.65 days, SD = 4.12, range 28-
47 days). 
 
Each session (the pretest, treatment, and two posttests) was audiotaped, and the experimenter and 
a second coder (blind to the experimental hypotheses and to the treatment) independently 
determined which rule each child used in that session. This was determined by the pattern of 
predictions and the justifications for the 14 configurations. Interrater reliability of assignment to 
rule was 89.9% for the pretest (across all rules), 94.8% for the treatment, 96.3% for the first 
posttest, and 94.8% for the second posttest. Rules allowing consistent prediction were somewhat 
easier to code (97.7% agreement overall) than those incorporating some inconsistency (88.7% 
agreement overall, the lowest being 76.7% agreement for Rule 1). When there were 
disagreements, the protocols were rescored blind by both coders and discussed until 
disagreements were resolved. 
 
A separate set of coders (blind as to the partners' pretest rules and type of pairing) coded (from 
both audiotapes and transcripts) the justifications used by each partner following the predictions 
and during any discussions. Justifications were of four types: no or idiosyncratic justification ("I 
like the blue side"); considering only number of weights, irrespective of distance from the 
fulcrum; considering distance when the number of weights was equal; and considering distance 
from the fulcrum when the number of weights was unequal. Interrater reliability of level of 
justification was 92% (disagreements were caused primarily by difficulties in hearing the 
children's responses, and were discussed until resolved in all but three cases, which were not 
used in these analyses). 
 
Subsequently, three further variables were created. Reasoning exposed to was a measure of 
whether children were exposed by their partner to reasoning that was at the same level, lower, or 
higher than the reasoning associated with their pretest rule. Higher (or lower) reasoning exposed 
to was indicated by a partner's verbal justification in support of a prediction in which both the 
prediction and justification were appropriate to a rule higher (or lower) than that used by the 
target child during the pretest. The justification could be made either immediately after the initial 
predictions or during the discussion that followed a disagreement on predictions. Thus, if both 
partners of an unequal rule pair initially predicted and justified using reasoning appropriate to 
their pretest rules, the more competent partner was coded as being exposed to lower reasoning, 
the less competent partner coded as being exposed to higher level reasoning. 
 
Reasoning adopted was a measure of whether children continued to use predictions and 
justifications appropriate to the pretest rule throughout (i.e., adopting the same reasoning), or 
adopted lower or higher level predicting and reasoning. It was possible for children to adopt 
lower or higher reasoning without having been exposed to it by their partner by justifying at a 
higher or lower level prior to their partner using that reasoning. For children to be coded as 
having adopted reasoning different from their pretest, they had to clearly predict and justify those 
predictions using reasoning appropriate to a rule other than their pretest rule. All paired sessions 
were independently coded for reasoning exposed to and reasoning adopted; interrater reliability 
was 91.9% for the former and 88.2% for the latter, with no decision reachable on three subjects. 
 
Reasoning accepted was defined as agreement between reasoning exposed to and reasoning 
adopted, under the condition that this reasoning differed from that used at the pretest. It was thus 
a measure of whether children were exposed to, and subsequently adopted, reasoning either 
higher or lower than that associated with their pretest rule. Occasionally children simply gave 
way to their partner without accepting the reasoning (wanting to go on to the next problem, or 
deciding it would be futile to try to convince the partner), in which case they were coded as 
having neither adopted nor accepted the partner's reasoning. Children were thus classified either 
as "acceptors" of their partner's reasoning (if they had been exposed to and had adopted such 




CONSEQUENCES OF COLLABORATION 
 
Initially, I shall focus on the consequences (rather than the processes) of collaboration. To 
examine whether the random exclusion of one member of each dyad may have unexpectedly 
affected the results, identical analyses were conducted with the entire sample. There were 
virtually no differences in the pattern of significant and nonsignificant findings. Moreover, 
analysis of all pair members using Inclusion/Exclusion as a variable revealed no significant 
differences between pair members who had been excluded and those included in the 
analyses discussed below. 
 
A 4 (condition: individuals, equal rule pairs, less competent partners, more competent partners) × 
2 (gender) × 3 (age group: 5-year-olds, 6-7-year-olds, 8-9-year-olds) × 4 (time: pretest, 
treatment, posttest 1, posttest 2) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted, 
using a multivariate approach to the analysis of repeated measures data (Maxwell & Delaney, 
1990). The first three factors were between-subjects factors, the fourth within-subjects. The 
General Linear Model of SAS (SAS, 1989) was used to allow for unequal cell sizes. Four 
subjects were unavailable for the second posttest; these analyses were therefore conducted with 
93 subjects. 
 
The MANOVA revealed that the main effect of time was not significant, and of the interactions, 
only the time × condition and time × gender effects proved significant. All other interactions 
were therefore dropped from the model. Age group was retained in the model because of 
significant between-subjects effects (to be discussed later). The results reported here refer to the 
independent effects of each of the variables (condition, gender, and age group), controlling for 
all other variables. 
 
The Effect of Treatment Condition on Outcome 
 
Between-subjects effects revealed no significant effect of condition, F(3, 86) = 2.04, N.S., 
indicating that the different conditions did not differ in terms of their overall mean level of rule 
use. MANOVA revealed that time, as a main effect, was not significant (Wilks's lambda F(3, 84) 
= 0.63, N.S.), but that the interaction of time × condition was significant (Wilks's lambda F(9, 
204) = 4.03, p < .0001). Planned comparisons of condition × time revealed that the four 
conditions at time 1 (pretest) significantly differed from those at time 2 (treatment), time 3 (first 
posttest), and time 4 (second posttest) (all df's 3, 86, F's > 8.38, p's < .0001), but that no other 
comparison was significant (i.e., conditions at time 2 did not differ from those at times 3 and 4, 
and so on). In other words, and as revealed in Table 1, the treatment conditions had a powerful 
impact on children's performance, and changes effected during the paired session proved highly 
stable. For this reason, discussion of the findings will focus on the second, delayed, posttest. 
 
Table 1. Mean Rule Use at Pretest, Treatment, and Two Posttests, by Treatment Group 
  Pretest Treatment First Post Second Post 
Group N M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
No partner 38a 3.00 (1.38) 2.92 (1.46) 2.89 (1.48) 3.00 (1.49) 
Equal partners 19 3.16 (1.38) 2.95 (1.51) 2.89 (1.29) 2.79 (1.55) 
Less competent partners 19 2.42 (.90) 3.26 (1.24) 3.11 (1.24) 3.11 (1.24( 
More competent partners 17b 4.29 (.85) 3.47 (1.37) 3.53 (1.23) 3.65 (1.22) 
a Three additional non paired children completed all but the second posttest. 
b One additional more competent partner completed all but the second posttest. 
 
The data were converted to difference scores (posttest-pretest) and analyzed by univariate 4 
(condition) × 2 (gender) × 3 (age group) analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) run on the 
difference scores, with pretest score as the covariate. All factors were between-subject factors. 
The data presented here and in subsequent analyses relate to the differences between the second 
posttest and the pretest. (Identical analyses were conducted on the first posttest-pretest difference 
scores, but these findings will be reported only when they did not parallel the findings based on 
second posttest-pretest differences.) The analyses revealed that the type of pairing explained a 
significant (and independent) amount of the variance, F(3, 85) = 4.63, p < .005. Post hoc tests of 
all pair-wise comparisons (using Tukey's HSD) revealed that the less competent partner 
condition differed significantly ( p < .05) from each other condition, and that the more competent 
partner condition differed from the nonpaired condition ( p < .05). No other comparisons were 
significant. Two-tailed t tests for dependent samples were run on the second posttest-pretest 
gains (or losses), comparing them with zero (no change). These analyses revealed that the group 
of less competent children was the only group that improved significantly from pretest 
score (M = 0.68, SD = 0.89, t(l8) = 3.37, p < .005). The group of more competent children was 
the only group to decline significantly (M = -0.65, SD = 1.06, t(l6) = - 2.52, p < .03). Children in 
the equal rule group declined, but not significantly (M = -0.37, SD = 0.83, t(l8) = -1.93, p < .07), 
and the nonpaired children on average used the same rule (M = 0, SD = 0.90). 
 
Regression artifacts.—Some of this change from one rule to another may be attributable to 
regression artifacts-more competent members had, on average, necessarily used a higher rule at 
the time of the pretest, while less competent members had used a lower rule. There are two ways 
in which regression artifacts must be considered here-the relative level (within the dyad) and the 
absolute level of the rules. First, focusing on the relative difference between members of unequal 
rule dyads, it should be noted that the more competent members of dyads did not exclusively use 
the highest rules. A Rule 2 user, paired with a child who used Rule 1, would be a more 
competent member; a Rule 2 user, paired with a child who used Rule 3, would be a less 
competent member. Irrespective of how high or low their initial scores were, less competent 
members tended either to improve on their pretest scores or continue to use the same rule, 
whereas more competent members tended either to regress or use the same rule. Moreover, 
regression artifacts would suggest that compromise would feature prominently in those dyads 
whose members differed by two rules. In fact, of the 17 dyads in which compromise was a 
possibility, this only occurred for two of them. 
 
Second, focusing on the absolute level of the rules, regression artifacts would result in Rule 1 
nonpaired children improving as much as Rule l less competent partners, and in Rule 5 nonpaired 
children declining as much as Rule 5 more competent partners. This hypothesis was not 
supported in the case of the Rule 1 children; all five nonpaired children continued to use their 
pretest scores at the time of the second posttest, whereas both less competent children improved 
by one rule. However, Rule 5 children did not significantly differ; four of the eight children who 
were not paired declined, as did three of the eight more competent partners. This finding may be 
evidence in favor of the regression hypothesis; an alternative hypothesis is that inconsistency is 
an uncomfortable cognitive state (Festinger, 1957), and it may be easier to slip down to a less 
sophisticated rule that allows consistency than to continue to use an inconsistent rule. Support for 
this hypothesis is derived from the fact that, whereas five of the seven nonpaired Rule 3 children 
declined to Rule 2, none of the eight nonpaired Rule 4 children declined, a pattern difficult to 
attribute to regression artifacts. 
 
Third, regression artifacts should be strongest for children using either Rule 1 or Rule 5 at the 
pretest. However, ANCOVAs run (with those children excluded) on condition and gender, with 
the dependent variable being the second posttest-pretest difference scores and pretest acting as 
the covariate (age group no longer exerted a significant effect), revealed, as before, a significant 
main effect of condition, F(3, 58) = 3.59, p < .02. Post hoc comparisons (using Tukey's HSD) for 
all pair-wise comparisons revealed that the only significant ( p < .05) comparison was between 
the lower partner and higher partner conditions. As was the case with the larger sample, two-
tailed t tests for dependent samples run on the second posttest-pretest differences revealed that 
only the group of less competent partners improved significantly (M = 0.65, SD = 0.93, t(l6) = 
2.86, p < .02); the group of more competent partners did not decline significantly at the time of 
the second posttest (M = -0.56, SD = 1.01, t(8) = -1.64, p < .15), although it did so at the first 
posttest (M = - 0.89, SD = 1.05, t(8) = - 2.53, p < .04). 
 
The Effect of Gender on Outcome 
 
With the exception of Bearison and his colleagues (Bearison & Filardo, 1986; Bearison, 
Magzamen, & Filardo, 1986), scholars who have examined the effects of peer collaboration on 
cognitive development either have not found or have not reported different types of performance 
for boys and girls. In the present study, the repeated-measures analysis revealed no between-
subjects effects, F(l, 86) = 1.45, N.S., indicating that on average boys and girls did not differ in 
terms of their overall rule use. However, the MANOV A time x gender interaction was 
significant (Wilks's lambda F(3, 84) = 3.48, p < .02). Planned comparisons across times for each 
gender revealed that the rules used by boys and girls at time 1 (pretest) differed significantly 
from their rule use at times 2, 3, and 4 (all df's 1, 86, F's> 4.33, p's < .05), but that no other 
comparison was significant. 
 
Subsequent univariate ANCOVAs (examining the independent effects of gender on second 
posttest-pretest difference scores in a model that included condition and age group, with pretest 
score as the covariate) revealed that boys and girls differed significantly across all conditions, 
F(l, 85) = 7.62, p < .008. Analysis of the second posttest-pretest differences by two-tailed t tests 
for dependent samples revealed that boys (pretest M = 3.04, SD = 1.36) did not significantly 
improve on their pretest rule (M = .21, SD = 0.87, t(42) = 1.30, p > .2), whereas girls (pretest M= 
3.23, SD = 1.29) significantly declined from their pretest rule (M= -.28, SD = 0.90, t(49) = -2.19, 
p < . 05). As previously noted, the interaction of condition × gender was not significant; the 
pattern of improvements across types of pairing was essentially the same for boys and girls. 
 
The Effect of Age on Outcome 
 
The repeated-measures MANOVA revealed a significant between-subjects effect of age, F(2, 86) 
= 20.27, p < .0001, indicating that the three age groups differed greatly in their overall mean 
level of rule use. The MANOVA test of the time × age group interaction revealed, however, that 
the pattern of differences between the age groups did not differ significantly over time (Wilks's 
lambda F(6, 168) = 1.34, N.S.). Post hoc tests of all pair-wise comparisons (using Tukey's HSD) 
revealed that at all four times all age groups differed significantly ( p < .05) from each other in 
terms of rule use. At the pretest, for example, although children at each age level used the full 
range of rules, the 5-year-olds used a lower rule on average (M = 2.38, SD = 1.16) than the 6-7-
year-olds (M = 3.19, SD = 1.14), whereas the 8-9-year-olds used, on average, higher rules (M = 
3.93, SD = 1.22). During treatment and at both posttests the ordering of age group relative to rule 
use remained the same. 
 
Because the between-group differences were significant, age group was kept in the ANCOVA 
model analyzing second posttest-pretest difference scores (pretest being the covariate), which 
revealed that the 5-yearolds, 6-7-year-olds, and 8-9-year-olds significantly differed in terms of 
second posttest performance, F(2, 85) = 5.87, p < .005. However, post hoc tests of all pair-wise 
comparisons (using Tukey's HSD) revealed no significant differences between any pairs of age 
groups in terms of improvement or decline. Two-tailed t tests for dependent samples on the 
second posttest-pretest differences revealed that across conditions the 5-year-olds and the group 
of 6-7-year-olds both declined from pretest, though not significantly (M's = -0.19, SD = 0.98 and 
-0.12, SD = 1.20, respectively), whereas the 8-9-year-olds improved (M = 0.18, SD = 0.72), 
though not significantly. 
 
Most noteworthy, the age × condition interaction was not significant, indicating that the effects 
of being paired with a more or less competent partner did not vary by age; 5-year-olds paired 
with a more competent peer were as likely to benefit from collaboration as 8-9-year-olds, and 
children of each age group were as likely to decline when paired with a less competent child. 
 
PROCESSES OF INTERACTION 
 
The analyses presented so far reveal that the presence and type of partner had a profound impact 
on both development and regression. To understand the reasons for both, it is necessary to 
examine the collaborative processes themselves to ascertain what occurred during the treatment 
session. Accordingly, the unit of analysis must change, from the individual to the dyad, in order 
to retain independence of the units. The outcome measure will therefore be dyadic, but rather 
than be a simple aggregate of the individual members' scores will comprise a measure of 
outcome patterns. Of the possible dyadic outcomes, all but two of the 56 dyads fell into one of 
three patterns: one or both pair members declined, with the other member at best retaining the 
pretest rule; both partners retained the same rule; one or both pair members improved, with the 
other member at worst retaining the pretest rule. (The partners in the two remaining dyads 
compromised, and were not included in the following analyses.) 
 
Type of Partner 
 
Dyads featuring children who came to the task with the same initial understanding (equal rule 
dyads) differed from unequal rule dyads in their pattern of rule retention, declines, and 
improvements, χ2(2, N = 54) = 18.15, p < .0001. Post hoc analyses were conducted first to 
discover whether the dyads significantly differed in terms of retention or changing their pretest 
rules, and second to discover, in the case of those who changed rules, whether the change was to 
a higher or a lower rule. These analyses (all of which were two-tailed) revealed that equal rule 
dyads were significantly more likely than unequal rule dyads to retain the same rule than change 
(nine of 19 and one of 35, respectively, Fisher's Exact Test, N = 54, p < .0001). However, among 
equal and unequal rule dyads in which rule change occurred, the direction of change did not 
differ significantly (Fisher's Exact Test, N = 44, p > .15). 
 
When regression occurred, it was more likely for both members of equal rule dyads to decline 
(four of seven dyads) than was the case for members of unequal rule dyads (one of 14 dyads), 
where the less competent child tended to retain the same rule and the more competent partner 
tended to move down (Fisher's Exact Test, N = 21, p < .001). The same was true of 
improvement—when this occurred in equal rule dyads it was true of both members (in all three 
cases), whereas in unequal rule dyads the more competent member typically (17 of 20 cases) 
retained his or her pretest rule, while the less competent child improved (Fisher's Exact Test, N = 
23, p < .02). 
 
Partners' rule relations.—Unequal rule partners were more likely to change rules than equal rule 
partners, and improvement was as likely as decline. But what induced dyad members to improve 
or decline? An understanding of partners' rule relations provides some answers. As described 
earlier, Rules 1, 3, and 5 incorporate inconsistency of response to some problems, whereas Rules 
2 and 4 do not. 
 
It should be noted initially that some of the dyads differed by two rules (partners both used either 
inconsistent rules [Rule 5-3 dyads] or consistent [Rule 4-2 dyads]), some by only one, but 
analysis revealed no significant differences in terms of either improvement or regression 
(Fisher's Exact Test, N = 34, p = .30). (The one dyad featuring children who retained their pretest 
rules [a high inconsistent-low consistent dyad] was dropped from this and subsequent analyses.) 
 
Examining first equal rule dyads, children in six of the eight "same inconsistent rule" dyads (five 
Rule 5, two Rule 3, and one Rule 1) changed rules, compared to only four of the 11 "same 
consistent rule" dyads (eight Rule 2 and three Rule 4 dyads). This difference, while suggestive, 
was not significant, however (Fisher's Exact Test, N = 19, p > .16). (A similar pattern was found 
among nonpaired children; 11 of 20 children using an inconsistent rule changed rules, compared 
to only seven of 21 who used a consistent rule, but this difference was not significant [Fisher's 
Exact Test, N = 41, p > .2].) 
 
Among unequal rule dyads, the patterns proved to be very different. These partners arrived at the 
collaborative session with different understandings of the task, and thus with the opportunity to 
arrive at a shared understanding-an understanding that could be, at least for the less competent 
partners, an opportunity for arriving at shared meaning at a higher level. 
 
The unequal rule dyads can be divided into four different types, based on partners' competence 
(high vs. low) and rule (consistent vs. inconsistent): (a) high consistent—low inconsistent dyads 
(two Rule 4-Rule 3 and four Rule 2–Rule 1 dyads), (b) high inconsistent-low consistent dyads 
(seven Rule 5–Rule 4 and five Rule 3–Rule 2 dyads), (c) different rules, both inconsistent (five 
Rule 5–Rule 3 dyads), and (d) different rules, both consistent (12 Rule 4–Rule 2 dyads). 
 
The most important comparison was between the high consistent-low inconsistent dyads and the 
remaining dyads, for the former are the analogs of the conserver-nonconserver dyads examined 
by the neo-Piagetian scholars. As can be seen in Table 2, these dyads were significantly more 
likely to feature improvement (in five of the six cases the less competent child improved while 
the more competent child retained the pretest rule, and in the sixth case both partners improved) 
than all other dyads, half of which featured decline and half improvement, with the one dyad in 
which the partners retained their pretest rules dropped from this analysis (Fisher's Exact Test, N 
= 34, p < .05). 
 
Table 2. Numbers (and %) of Dyads in Which Decline, Retention of Rule, and Improvement 
Occurred, Related to Consistency/Inconsistency of Partners' Rules in Equal and Unequal Rule 
Dyads 
Rule Relationshipa Both Down 
One Downb 
One Stays Both Stay 
One Upc 
One Stays Both Up 
Equal rule dyads:           
Both Cd (2-2, 4-4) 1 (9.1) 1 (9.1) 7 (63.6) 0 (0) 2 (18.2) 
Both Incd (1-1, 3-3, 5-5) 4 (50.0) 1 (12.5) 2 (25.0) 0 (0) 1 (12.5) 
Unequal rule dyads:           
High C-low Inc (4-3, 2-1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (83.5) 1 (16.7) 
High Inc-low C (5-4, 3-2) 0 (0) 5 (41.7) 1 (8.3) 6 (50.0) 0 (0) 
Diff Inc (5-3) 1 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 0 (0) 3 (60.0) 0 (0) 
Diff C (4-2) 0 (0) 7 (58.3) 0 (0) 3 (25.0) 2 (16.7) 
a The five most common dyadic outcomes (two unequal dyads compromised). 
b In unequal rule dyads, the higher partner declined. 
c In unequal rule dyads, the lower partner improved. 
d C = consistent rule at pretest; Inc = inconsistent rule at pretest. 
 
Thus only the collaboration between high consistent–low inconsistent partners was an 
unqualified success, in that the lower (less competent) partners all improved, whereas no higher 
(more competent) partners regressed. In the three remaining dyadic types, the patterns of 




What might account for the fact that members of dyads that were identical in terms of type of 
partner and rule relations differed so clearly during the paired sessions? One possible answer 
relates to the intersubjective understanding attained in each dyad. As described above, reasoning 
accepted was defined as agreement between reasoning exposed to and reasoning adopted, under 
the condition that this reasoning differed from that used at the pretest. Acceptors were fairly 
evenly distributed by age group (seven of 12 5-year-olds, nine of 13 6–7-year-olds, and three of 
11 8–9-yearolds accepted their partner's reasoning) and by gender (eight of 16 boys and 11 of 20 
girls accepted their partner's reasoning). 
 
To test the extent to which accepting the partner's reasoning had an effect on posttest scores, a 2 
(reasoning accepted: yes, no) × 2 (condition: less competent dyad members, more competent 
dyad members) × 2 (gender: male, female) × 3 (age group: 5-year-olds, 6–7-year-olds, 8–9-year-
olds) × 2 (consistency; consistent rule, inconsistent rule) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was 
run on the second posttest-pretest difference scores, with pretest score as the covariate. Gender, 
age group, and consistency did not exert significant independent effects on the posttest, either as 
main effects or in interaction with reasoning accepted, and were therefore dropped. This analysis 
revealed that although reasoning accepted as a main effect did not account significantly for 
posttest performance, F(l, 31) = 1.38, p > .2, both the main effect of condition, F(l, 31) = 6.41, 
p<.02, and the interaction of reasoning accepted and condition, F(l, 31) = 20.48, p < .0001, were 
significant. To clarify the nature of the two-way interaction, ANCOVAs were run to test the 
simple effects of reasoning accepted on each condition separately. Reasoning accepted was 
significantly related to second posttest performance for the group of less competent dyad 
members, F(l, 16) = 5.57, p < .04, and the group of more competent dyad members, F(l, 14) = 
17.42, p < .001. 
 
Two-tailed t tests for dependent samples run on the second posttest-pretest differences revealed 
that, on average, acceptors (M = - 0.05, SD = 1.54, n = 19) and nonacceptors (M = 0.18, SD = 
0.53, n = 17) did not significantly improve or decline from pretest. On the other hand, the group 
of less competent dyad members significantly improved from pretest (M = 0.68, SD = 0.89, 
t(l8)=3.37, p < .004), and the group of more competent dyad members significantly declined (M 
= -0.65, SD = 1.06, t(l6) = - 2.52, p < .03). The pretest rule used by the less competent members 
(M = 2.42, SD = 0.90, n = 19) was on average lower than that used by the more competent 
members (M = 4.29, SD = 0.85, n = 17). These data appear to suggest that regression artifacts 
may have played a critical role in these results. However, the significant interaction of reasoning 
accepted and condition revealed that improvement among the less competent dyad members was 
found only for those who accepted their partners' reasoning, and that the same was true for 
declines of the more competent dyad members (see Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Mean Improvements and Declines from Pretest to Delayed Posttest, as a Function of 
Condition and Accepting Partner's Reasoning 
  Pretest Rule Improvement and Decline 
Condition/Acceptance N M SD M SD ta p 
Less competent:        
Acceptors 10 2.40 .97 1.10 .87 3.97 < .004 
Nonacceptors 9 2.44 .88 .22 .66 1.00 < .4 
More competent:        
Acceptors 9 4.22 .67 –1.33 1.00 –4.00 < .004 
Nonacceptors 8 4.37 1.06 .12 .35 1.00 < .4 





Most of the developmental research on peer collaboration, primarily based on a Piagetian 
theoretical foundation, has supported the view that such collaboration leads to cognitive 
development. Less work has been conducted in this area by Vygotskian scholars, and the results 
(see, e.g., Forman & Cazden, 1985) are not so favorable. However, none of the previous research 
has provided evidence that the effects of collaboration can be detrimental to children's thinking. 
Indeed, as far as Piagetian scholars are concerned, regression should rarely occur, and at worst be 
short-lived. 
 
In the current study, however, although collaboration between children who differed in their 
level of competence on occasion proved beneficial, regression was at least as common an 
outcome, and was just as stable. Part of the discrepancy in experimental outcomes may be traced 
to an unanticipated confound in the Piagetian-inspired research, which may have led to an overly 
optimistic portrayal of the cognitive consequences of collaboration. Most of the Piaget-inspired 
research features conserver-nonconserver pairs. The unintended confound is that conservers are 
necessarily (according to Piaget) more certain of their beliefs than nonconservers; only the 
former understand the "logical necessity" of their position (Murray, 1982, 1987; Smith & 
Murray, 1985; Tudge & Winterhoff, 1991). Additional research supports the view that this 
greater certainty (rather than social dominance, for example), is the key factor (Miller, 1986; 
Miller & Brownell, 1975; Miller, Brownell, & Zukier, 1977). 
 
Results from studies featuring pairs of nonconservers or transitional conserver-nonconserver 
dyads may appear to run counter to this view. However, these data are inconclusive; in some 
studies nonconserver-nonconserver dyads benefited from collaboration (Ames & Murray, 1982; 
Mugny & Doise, 1978), but in other studies they did not (Mugny & Doise, 1978; Perret-
Clermont, 1980; Russell, 1982). The same discrepancies are apparent among dyads featuring 
pairs of transitional conservers (Perret-Clermont, 1980). Smith and Murray (1985) argued that 
this difference in findings may be explained by differences in nonconservers' beliefs; some 
nonconservers in their study exhibited an erroneous "false necessity," and it was these children 
who improved. Other nonconservers, who had no such certainty in their beliefs, did not improve. 
 
The present study allowed some disentangling of this confounding of competence and 
confidence, by pairing dyads in such a way that the more competent dyad members did not 
always have access to a rule that allowed consistency of prediction and thus, perhaps, more 
confidence in that rule. In line with the results reported both by Piagetian scholars and those 
influenced by Vygotsky, less competent inconsistent dyad members who were paired with more 
competent consistent partners clearly improved in their thinking, and the latter did not regress. 
However, this was the only condition that produced such favorable results; in many other cases 
improvement did not occur and some children regressed in their thinking. It seems clear that we 
must specify the conditions relating collaboration and development more carefully than has 
previously been done. 
 
In this study, a reliance solely on the consequences of collaboration was insufficient to examine 
these conditions. The results indicated that, on average, the group of less competent partners 
improved as a result of collaboration whereas the group of more competent partners regressed. 
(Nonpaired children and those whose partner had used the same rule did not change much from 
pretest.) Focusing on the processes of collaboration, however, allowed fuller understanding of 
the conditions likely to lead to development, regression, or to no change in thinking. 
 
For children to benefit from collaboration it appeared helpful to have a partner whose thinking 
was at a more advanced level, but this, by itself, was not sufficient; the more competent partner 
needed to introduce reasoning into the discussion at a level appropriate to his or her thinking. Of 
yet more importance was that the less competent child needed to accept that higher level 
reasoning (rather than simply being exposed to it) in the course of discussion. 
 
As far as age differences are concerned, these results do not support a Piagetian interpretation, 
for 5-year-olds were as likely to benefit from collaboration (under the right conditions) as 8–9-
year-olds. As Vygotsky argued, collaboration between a young child and a more competent peer 
can be an effective source of cognitive development. The gender differences that were found 
were not expected, however, and without further research any conclusions drawn from this study 
should be both tentative and speculative. It is possible, however, that because the task was 
mathematical or scientific it was of more interest to boys than to girls, and that the greater 
improvement on the part of boys is attributable to that greater interest. (It was not the case that 
boys were more likely to have access to a consistent rule than girls—no differences were found 
on that dimension—χ2(1, N = 97) = 0.15, p > .6.) 
 
The current data, I believe, can best be understood within a Vygotskian framework. The study 
was not intended to be a test of Vygotsky's concept of the zone of proximal development—work 
is currently under way that examines the impact of the partner providing information at a variety 
of levels. Suffice it to say that, as expected, a zone of proximal development could be created in 
the course of discussion when the differences in rules were either one or two; no differences 
were found as a function of level. However, rather than assuming that when a zone is created it is 
unfailingly in a developmentally appropriate direction, these data suggest that such a zone may 
be formed either in front of or behind a child's current level of thinking, depending on the 
information provided by the partner and whether or not this reasoning was accepted. As is clear 
from the data provided in Table 3, regression of the more competent members of dyads and 
improvement of the less competent members seem to be a function of whether or not these 
children were persuaded to accept their partner's reasoning. Both members of a dyad thus 
attained intersubjectivity or shared understanding, but this process could lead either to 
developmental advance or decline. Vygotsky argued that "the zone of proximal development 
defines those functions that have not yet matured but are in process of maturation, functions that 
will mature tomorrow but are currently in embryonic state" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). Perhaps 
functions (or approaches to problem solution) that are not fully developed are malleable and can 
have their development impeded, as a result of social interaction, leading to regression to a 
previously "developed" function, just as they can be raised to a developmentally more advanced 
level. (A similar point has been argued by Ignjatovic-Savic, Kovac-Cerovic, Plut, & Pesikan, 
1988.) 
 
There is little indication that agreement attained during the treatment was reached simply for the 
sake of agreeing; if so, as in the case of the conservers who "regressed" when paired with an 
adult who provided nonconservation responses (Ames & Murray, 1982), the regression should 
have been short-lived. Instead, changes in rule use that resulted from the process of discussion 
proved remarkably stable—whether they featured improvement or regression. In the cases where 
partners initially differed in their thinking, what occurred during the treatment was more than 
just agreement, therefore; shared understanding was attained by the pair members and 
intersubjectivity was reached. This newly found shared reasoning proved enduring. It was as 
though, as Vygotsky argued, the child's partner remained "invisibly present." 
 
Some caution in generalizing should be exercised, however. First, the children in this study at no 
time received any feedback, either from the experimenter or from the materials themselves. As is 
the case with the Piagetian work with conservers and nonconservers, the children at no time 
received independent confirmation or disconfirmation of their predictions. Differences of 
opinion were resolved solely on the verbal plane. Thus the regression found in this study may be 
limited to situations in which children are not provided with any type of feedback. Support for 
this view is provided by research in which children, provided with feedback after working on 
similar problems, showed no evidence of regression (Tudge, 1991). 
 
A second cautionary note is that the social world, which here has been instantiated as the dyadic 
interactions, also included a third person—the experimenter. The experimenter's role was simply 
to set up the problems, and see that the partners took turns to make their initial predictions. Once 
agreement was reached, no indication was given of the accuracy of that prediction. However, 
silence on the part of an adult typically implies consent—or surely an incorrect answer would be 
challenged. One reason for the stability in changes of rule use, once agreement was reached, may 
thus have been an inadvertent strengthening of the child's conviction that the agreed-upon 




The results of this research suggest that children can and do assist each other's thinking in the 
course of collaborative problem solving, as predicted by both Piagetian and Vygotskian theory. 
However, in contradiction to the typically beneficial results reported (particularly by Piagetian 
scholars), these data indicate that there are circumstances in which children can adversely affect 
each other's thinking. In this paper I have explored some of the conditions that need to be 
considered when children are asked to work together to solve problems and are not provided 
with feedback. 
 
The results suggest that the Piagetian scholars working in this area (who also do not provide 
participants with independent confirmation or disconfirmation of their positions) may have 
overemphasized the benefits of collaboration by confounding competence and confidence. This 
study provided some support for the Vygotskian position, in that less competent children 
(including those younger than Piaget suggested) could indeed benefit from working with a more 
competent peer and that arriving at shared meaning or intersubjective understanding in the 
course of discussion was a highly effective means of bringing about changes in thinking. 
Working with a partner with whom there was already intersubjectivity was much less likely to be 
associated with change. On the other hand, the intersubjective understanding attained in the 
course of discussion was as likely to be in a regressive as in a progressive direction, with both 
regression (at least in the absence of disconfirming evidence) and development proving stable 
phenomena. This finding is certainly not predicted by Piagetian theory. It also does not fit with a 
Vygotskian position that incorporates the view that intersubjective understanding gained in 
collaboration with a more competent partner is always in a developmentally advanced direction. 
If these results prove to be replicable, it would imply that both Piagetian and Vygotskian theory 
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